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NOTE
PUNITIVE DAMAGES - Recovery of Compensatory Damages as a Pre-
requisite - Tucker v. Marcus, 142 Wis. 2d 425, 418 N.W.2d 818 (1988)
I. INTRODUCTION
Should punitive damages be recoverable if a comparative negligence
statute bars recovery of compensatory damages? In Tucker v. Marcus,I the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that an award of $50,000 in punitive
damages could not be awarded because Section 895.045 of the Wisconsin
Statutes2 barred the recovery of compensatory damages.
In so ruling, the court acknowledged that the recovery of compensatory
damages is a prerequisite for punitive damages.4 Pivotal to the court's deci-
sion was its reliance on Hanson v. Valdivia 5 and Widemshek v. Fale.6 The
court indicated that if there exists a cause of action, but the action is not
one for which the recovery of compensatory damages is justified, punitive
damages cannot be awarded.7
This Note begins with a brief synopsis of the facts in Tucker v. Marcus.8
A discussion of the pertinent history and rationale behind punitive dam-
ages, as well as a review of the comparative negligence statute in Wisconsin,
will follow. 9 A discussion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion in
Tucker v. Marcus 1" will then be presented, and this Note will conclude with
an assessment of the decision and its impact on future cases involving the
recovery of punitive damages."
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 9, 1983, fourteen-year-old Nathaniel Tucker drowned in a
swimming pool at the MGM Health Club in Madison, Wisconsin. Two
1. 142 Wis. 2d 425, 418 N.W.2d 818 (1988).
2. Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1987-88).
3. Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 454, 418 N.W.2d at 829.
4. Id. at 438, 418 N.W.2d at 823.
5. 51 Wis. 2d 466, 187 N.W.2d 151 (1971).
6. 17 Wis. 2d 337, 117 N.W.2d 275 (1962).
7. Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 443, 418 N.W.2d at 825.
8. See infra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 19-45 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 46-67 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 68-100 and accompanying text.
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years after Nathaniel's death, his mother, Carol Tucker, filed suit in the
Circuit Court of Dane County seeking compensatory and punitive damages
in a wrongful death and survival action.12  During the trial, evidence was
presented which established two possible causes for the drowning. One pos-
sible cause was Nathaniel's inexperience as a swimmer and his underdevel-
oped swimming skills.13 Another possibility was that the condition of the
water in the pool unnecessarily delayed the attempted rescue. 14 Testimony
at trial established that the pool had been improperly chlorinated and the
filtration system had been consistently clogged. Consequently, the would-
be rescuers' ability to save Nathaniel had been hindered by their inability to
see him clearly, except at close range.' 5
At the close of the trial, the jury apportioned seventy percent of the
causal negligence to Nathaniel, twenty percent to Nathaniel's adult supervi-
sor and ten percent to the owner of the club, Marvin Marcus. The jury then
awarded both compensatory and punitive damages to Carol Tucker in the
wrongful death action and to Nathaniel's estate in the survival action.
16
The jury determined that Nathaniel's estate was entitled to $50,000 in puni-
tive damages. The trial court found insignificant the fact that Carol Tucker
did not actually receive compensatory damages and stated that "punitive
damages . ..are not effected [sic] by the attribution of fault."17 The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the trial court decision, holding that
punitive damages were only available if actual damages had been awarded
and recovered. 18
12. Tucker v. Marcus, 142 Wis. 2d 425, 429, 418 N.W.2d 818, 819 (1988).
13. Nathaniel was at the pool on the day of the drowning incident with his two minor sisters
and an adult supervisor. See id. at 429-30, 418 N.W.2d at 819.
14. The indoor pool area was dirty, with large earthworms crawling in the area. Also, visibil-
ity was reduced by fog. The foggy conditions persisted despite frequent instructions from the city
pool inspector to keep the air heaters turned on. Id. at 461, 418 N.W.2d at 832.
15. This again was due to cloudy water. The pool was also improperly chlorinated and the
filtration system itself was often clogged with the byproducts of human grease, sweat, and urine.
Id. at 461-62, 418 N.W.2d at 832.
16. Since the decedent's negligence was in excess of 50%, the compensatory damages were
unavailable under Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1987-88). Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 430-31, 418 N.W.2d at
819.
17. Id. at 431, 418 N.W.2d at 820.
18. Id.
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III. BACKGROUND ON THE LAW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES: ENGLISH
COURTS, AMERICAN COURTS AND WISCONSIN COURTS
A. English Courts
Punitive damages developed from excessive awards of compensatory
damages. 19 In the eighteenth century, English juries, in effect, granted pu-
nitive sums since the compensatory damages awarded were far in excess of
the injury to the plaintiff.20 Early English courts were reluctant to set aside
these excessive awards, choosing instead to defer to the judgment of the
jury.2" As English courts began to recognize that sums awarded in excess
of the plaintiff's actual injury were punitive in nature, the judiciary focused
on both the defendant's conduct22 and the resulting injury to the plaintiff.23
19. See Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L.
REV. 1117, 1119 (1984) (remedy of multiple awards preceded punitive damages). See generally K.
REDDEN, PUNrrIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(A)(1)(1980) (multiple damages recognized several thousand
years before punitive damages). Examples of punitive damages have been noted in the Code of
Hammurabi in 2000 B.C., in the Hittite Law of 1400 B.C., the Hindu Code of Manu in 200 B.C.,
and the Bible. Id. at § 22.
20. See Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (C.P. 1763)(suit for wrongful detention,
trespass, and assault based on an invalid general warrant). The defendant alleged that the dam-
ages were "most outrageous," to which the court responded:
The personal injury done to him was very small, so that if the jury had been confined by
their oath to consider the mere personal injury only, perhaps 20 [pounds] damages would
have been thought damages sufficient.., they saw a magistrate over all the King's subjects
exercising arbitrary power, violating Magna Charta, and attempting to destroy the liberty
of the kingdom, by insisting upon the legality of this general warrant.... These are the
ideas which struck the jury on the trial; and I think they have done right in giving exem-
plary damages.
Id. at 768-69; see also Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of
Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1158, 1160 (1966)(after jury award of excessive damages,
court affirmed grant setting forth concept of punitive damages as a statement of societal disap-
proval). The Huckle decision was the first to articulate punitive damages. See Id.
21. See, e.g., Leith v. Pope, 96 Eng. Rep. 777, 778 (C.P. 1780)(court declined to interfere with
jury award unless evidence indicated award was so excessive it pointed to misconduct by jury);
Tullidge v. Wade, 95 Eng. Rep. 909, 909 (C.P. 1769)(court upheld plaintiff's damage award in
excess of actual injury); Grey v. Grant, 95 Eng. Rep. 794, 795 (C.P. 1764)(court denied defend-
ant's plea to set aside excessive damages awarded to plaintiffs). See generally 1 J. GHIARDI & J.
KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.02 (1985)(presents historical analysis of
punitive damages in English common law).
In order to understand the granting of excessive awards by English juries and the courts'
reluctance to override excessive awards, it is important to first understand the composition of
English juries. Id. English juries in the eighteenth century were comprised of local citizens who
acted as both witnesses and jurors due to their familiarity with the disputed issue. See K. RED-
DEN, supra note 19, § 2.2(A)(2), at 26. Based on the jurors' familiarity with the dispute. the court
not only deferred to the jury, but was reluctant to review excessive awards. See Note, supra note
20, at 1159-60.
22. See, e.g., Merest v. Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep. 761, 761 (C.P. 1814)(court sustained excessive
award stating worse conduct could not be conceived); Leith, 96 Eng. Rep. at 778 (court approved
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Judgments awarding excessive damages were sustained to punish the de-
fendant's misconduct 24 and to compensate the plaintiff for intangible, yet
egregious, injuries.25
B. American Courts
Early American courts awarded punitive damages for compensation
and punishment. 26 These early courts considered punitive and compensa-
tory damages as two separate and distinct types of awards.27 Punitive dam-
ages could only be awarded incident to an independent cause of action.28
This concept led to the general rule that actual damages are a prerequisite
jury's excessive award upon finding that defendant acted maliciously); Grey, 95 Eng. Rep. at 795
(excessive damages upheld by the court based on defendant's use of excessive physical force).
23. See Bruce v. Rawlins, 95 Eng. Rep. 934, 934-35,(C.P. 1770)(since plaintiff's home and
family were disturbed, court refused to reduce damages); Tullidge, 95 Eng. Rep. at 909 (plaintiff
was insulted in his own home and court refused to overrule damages). For a discussion of the
historical development of punitive damages in England and America, see Note, Exemplary Dam-
ages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517, 518-20 (1957).
24. See Merest, 128 Eng. Rep. at 761 (damages in excess of injury upheld in order to restrain
and punish defendant); Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (C.P. 1763)(purpose of dam-
ages is to compensate plaintiff and to punish and deter guilty party). But cf C. MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 78, at 278 (1935)(unclear in England whether theory of
punitive damages is punitive or compensatory in nature).
25. See Bruce, 95 Eng. Rep. at 934 (where plaintiff's reputation was injured by defendant's
actions, court sustained a large damage award); Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 769 (court recognized
that harm to plaintiff was small, but upheld excessive award due to indignity suffered by plaintiff);
see also Note, supra note 23, at 519 (English courts permitted excessive damages in aggravated
cases for injuries to plaintiff's dignity, feeling and mental suffering). See generally REDDEN, supra
note 19, § 2.2(C), at 28 (punitive damages were developed to compensate for intangible injuries to
victim not recoverable at common law).
26. Compare Bixby v. Dunlop, 56 N.H. 456, 464 (1876) (where malice is involved, plaintiff is
entitled to compensation) and Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 356 (1873)(punitive damages compen-
satory in nature) with Hawk v. Ridgway, 33 Ill. 473, 476 (1864)(court authorized award to plain-
tiff of damages beyond actual injury as punishment for defendant's willful and wanton
misconduct) and McNamara v. King, 7 Ill. 432, 437 (1845)(excessive damages upheld to punish
defendant).
27. See Kerschbaum v. Lowrey, 165 Minn. 233, 236, 206 N.W. 171, 183 (1925)(punitive
damages awarded at discretion of jury, not as a matter of right); Gill v. Selling, 125 Or. 587, 591,
267 P. 812, 814 (1928)(plaintiff must be satisfied with complete compensation, since punitive dam-
ages are awarded only in appropriate cases); see also W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984) (punitive damages awarded to plaintiff over and above actual
damages).
28. See, e.g., Schippel v. Norton, 38 Kan. 567, 571, 16 P. 804, 807 (1888)(cause of action
cannot be based on punitive damages); Ganssly v. Perkins, 30 Mich. 492, 494-95 (1874)(if plaintiff
has injury, punitive damages are recoverable); Hoagland v. Forest Park Highlands Amusement
Co., 170 Mo. 377, 381, 70 S.W. 878, 880 (1902)(punitive damages incident to actual damages
cannot form basis for cause of action).
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to the granting of punitive damages.29 Although most courts have adhered
to the general rule requiring actual damages before allowing punitive
awards, the rule's requirement is subject to varying interpretations.30
Today, punitive damages are awarded for purposes of punishment and
deterrence. 31 The defendant's improper actions are the focus of the puni-
tive damages determination. 32 Typically, punitive damages are awarded if a
defendant acts willfully or wantonly, or in a malicious, reckless or oppres-
sive manner.33 If the wrongful conduct can be established,34 punitive dam-
ages will be assessed to punish the defendant's behavior and to deter the
29. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 111 Ariz. 585, 589, 535 P.2d
1302, 1303 (1975) (before punitive damages are recovered, actual damages must be established);
Armijo v. Ward Transp., 134 Col. 275, 281, 302 P.2d 517, 519 (1956)(proof of actual damages
needed before punitive damages awarded); Smith v. Krutar, 153 Mont. 325, 336, 457 P.2d 459,
464 (1969)(plaintiff must show entitlement to actual damages before punitive damages are
recoverable).
30. Compare Martin v. United Sec. Servs., 314 So. 2d 765, 772 (Fla. 1975)(actual damages
must be shown before punitive damages are recoverable) and Wagner v. Dan Unfug Motors, Inc.,
35 Fla. Col. App. 102, 108, 529 P.2d 656, 659 (1974)(actual damages must be awarded before
punitive damages are granted) with Harris v. Wagshal, 343 A.2d 283, 288 (D.C. 1975)(punitive
damages awarded where actual damages are not recovered) and Haugabrook v. Taylor, 225 Ga.
317, 321, 168 S.E.2d 162, 163 (1969)(nominal damages will support an award of punitive dam-
ages). See also Saunders Hardware Five and Ten, Inc. v. Low, 307 So. 2d 893, 894 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1974)(injury presumed in defamation suit and will sustain an award of punitive damages
even if no actual damages). See generally Note, supra note 23, at 529 (relationship between puni-
tive and actual damages is a controversial subject).
31. See, eg., Acheson v. Shafter, 107 Ariz. 576, 578, 490 P.2d 832, 834 (1971)(punitive dam-
ages awarded to punish and deter wrongdoer); Motor Equip. Co. v. McLaughlin, 156 Kan. 258,
275, 133 P.2d 149, 159 (1943)(purpose of punitive damages is to punish and restrain defendant
from further wrongful acts and deter others); Main v. Levine, 109 Okla. 564, 570, 118 P.2d 252,
255 (1941)(punitive damages designed to punish, warn, and deter transgressor); see also Sales &
Cole, supra note 19, at 1117, 1124-25 (1984)(majority of commentators acknowledge that the
purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter). But see Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575,
578, 150 A. 692, 693 (1930)(purpose of punitive damages is compensation of plaintiff for injuries);
Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 231, 190 N.W. 746, 747 (1922)(punitive damages not considered
punishment, but used to enlarge compensatory damages).
32. See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46 (Alaska 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 405 (Alaska 1979)(punitive damages recoverable
when defendant's conduct outrageous); Satterfield v. Rebsamen Ford, Inc., 253 Ark. 181, 189, 485
S.W.2d 192, 195 (1972)(malicious conduct by defendant will support award of punitive damages);
Riegel v. Aastad, 272 A.2d 715, 718 (Del. 1970)(when tortfeasor commits wrongful act willfully
or wantonly, punitive damages are recoverable); see also 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note
21, § 5.01, at 2 (focus of punitive damages is on defendant's conduct).
33. See, e.g., Bridges v. Alaska Hous. Auth., 375 P.2d 696, 702 (Alaska 1962)(malice, reck-
lessness or bad motive justify punitive damages); Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 126 Fla.
308, 323, 171 So. 214, 221 (1936)(where wrongdoer acts willfully, wantonly, with malice, violence,
oppression or fraud, punitive damages may be awarded); Gilman Paper Co. v. James, 235 Ga.
348, 355, 219 S.E.2d 447, 450 (1975)(willful and wanton misconduct authorize punitive damages).
34. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9-10 (4th ed. 1971). Profes-
sor Prosser asserts:
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defendant from further misconduct.35 Punishing the defendant also serves
as a general deterrent by providing an example to others who might engage
in similar misconduct.
3 6
C. Wisconsin Courts
Wisconsin first adopted a system of comparative negligence in 193 1.
37
Until 1971, that system prohibited "recovery of damages for negligence if
the injured person's negligence was 'as great as' that of the wrongdoer." 38
The comparative negligence law was changed in 1971 to one permitting
recovery unless the injured person's negligence was 'greater than' the negli-
gence of the person against whom recovery was sought. 39 Regardless of the
revision, the statute's "damages for negligence" language remained the
same." Case law predating 1971 interpreted "damages for negligence" to
mean ordinary negligence.41
Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive dam-
ages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or "malice" or
a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate
disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton.
Id. at 9-10; see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 24, § 79, at 280. Professor McCormick states:
Since these damages are assessed for punishment and not for reparation, a positive element
of conscious wrongdoing is always required. It must be shown either that the defendant
was activated by ill-will, malice, or evil motive (which may appear by direct evidence of
such nature, or from the inherent character of the tort itself, or from the oppressive charac-
ter of his conduct, sometimes called "circumstances of aggravation"), or by fraudulent
purposes, or that he was so wanton and reckless as to evince a conscious disregard of the
rights of others.
Id.
35. See, eg., Main v. Levine, 189 Okla. 564, 570, 118 P.2d 252, 255 (1941)(punitive damages
to punish and deter defendant and others); Hicks v. Herring, 246 S.C. 429, 435, 144 S.E.2d 151,
155 (1965)(punitive damages awarded to punish and deter defendant from like offenses). See gen-
erally Comment, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Com-
ment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 134-47 (1982)(discussion of deterrent and punishment purposes of
punitive damages).
36. See, e.g., F.B.C. Stores v. Duncan, 198 S.E.2d 595, 599 (Va. 1973)(punishment of defend-
ant to serve as example to others who would engage in such conduct); John Mohr & Sons v.
Jahnke, 55 Wis. 2d 402, 411, 198 N.W.2d 363, 368 (1972)(punitive damages to punish and deter
defendant and others); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 191 (Wyo. 1979)(since punitive dam-
ages punish defendant, others are warned and deterred).
37. Wis. STAT. § 242 (1931).
38. Tucker v. Marcus, 142 Wis. 2d 425, 433, 418 N.W.2d 818, 820 (1988).
39. Id.
40. WIs. STAT. § 895.045 (1987-88).
41. Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 434-35, 418 N.W.2d at 821; see also Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d
1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962). Gross negligence was not compared to ordinary negligence under the
comparative negligence statute. Additionally, punitive damages were available only for conduct
amounting to gross negligence. As such, any conduct for which punitive damages might be
awarded would not be subject to the comparative negligence law. The Supreme Court of Wiscon-
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Long-standing principles of Wisconsin law indicate that there is no in-
dependent cause of action for punitive damages.42 In order to support a
punitive award, the plaintiff must prove the existence of actual harm caused
by the wrongful conduct of the defendant. 3
Wisconsin courts have sustained awards of punitive damages when com-
pensatory damages were available under the comparative negligence stat-
ute." When comparing Wisconsin to other jurisdictions, the key is to
determine whether "actual damages" should be construed in a broad sense
to refer only to harm that is capable of measurement in terms of compensa-
tory damages.
IV. THE TUCKER OPINIONS
A. The Ceci Majority
Justice Ceci, writing for the majority in Tucker v. Marcus," acknowl-
edged that compensatory damages were not available under Section 895.045
of the Wisconsin Statutes due to the apportionment of negligence. He indi-
cated that the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages
under the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute, dictates the inclusion
of punitive damages within the phrase "damages for negligence." The ma-
jority held that punitive damages may not be recovered where actual dam-
ages are unavailable due to the operation of the comparative negligence
statute.
In finding that the phrase "damages for negligence" does not include
punitive damages, the court first relied upon well-recognized principles of
sin in Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 275, 294 N.W.2d 437, 446 (1980), interpreted
the dicta in Bielski to mean that punitive damages are not recoverable if the wrongdoer's conduct
is merely negligent. Other jurisdictions using a comparative negligence system identical to the
Wisconsin system also indicate that punitive damages are not "damages for negligence." See, e.g.,
Lane v. Meserve, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 659, 482 N.E.2d 530, review denied, 396 Mass. 1103, 485
N.E.2d 188 (1985).
42. Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 434-35, 418 N.W.2d at 821; see also Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d
426, 432, 369 N.W.2d 677, 681 (1985), reconsideration denied, 126 Wis. 2d 40, 373 N.W.2d 672
(1985). The availability of punitive damages in a negligence case depends upon whether the plain-
tiff proves all of the elements constituting a cause of action. Punitive damages "do not rise from
negligence." Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 275, 294 N.W.2d at 446.
43. See, e.g., Widemshek v. Fale, 17 Wis. 2d 337, 117 N.W.2d 275 (1962)(no loss was suffered
and therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to any recovery).
44. See Malco, Inc. v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, 14 Wis. 2d 57, 109 N.W.2d 516 (1961)(pu-
nitive damages equalled fifteen times the compensatory damages given).
45. See, e.g., 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KJRCHER, supra note 21, § 3.07.
46. 142 Wis. 2d 425, 418 N.W.2d 818 (1988).
19891
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statutory construction.4 7 Relying on such case law, the majority deter-
mined that the language of the statute did not contemplate anything beyond
ordinary negligence.48
The majority further held, perhaps even more persuasively, that includ-
ing punitive damages in the phrase "damages for negligence" denies recog-
nition of the punishment and deterrence purposes of punitive damages.4 9
Justice Ceci went on to reason that calculating punitive damages by a math-
ematical formula had been expressly rejected.5 °
In holding that punitive damages cannot be awarded in the absence of
actual damages, the majority concluded that the actual damages must be
compensatory under the comparative negligence statute. 1 The court rea-
soned that actual damages "suffered" or "sustained" were not enough for
punitive damages to be awarded. 2 The majority also explained that al-
lowing punitive damages where actual damages may have been "suffered"
or "sustained" was not intended, and would thus deviate from the modified
comparative negligence doctrine enacted in Wisconsin in 1971.11 Justice
47. Id. at 434, 418 N.W.2d at 821; see also Delvaux v. Vanden Langenberg, 130 Wis. 2d 464,
476, 387 N.W.2d 751, 755 (1986); Munninghoff v. Wisconsin Conservation Comm'n, 255 Wis.
252, 258, 38 N.W.2d 712, 714 (1949); State v. Hackbarth, 228 Wis. 108, 121, 279 N.W. 687, 693
(1938).
48. The majority also used Lane v. Meserve, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 659, 482 N.E.2d 530, review
denied, 396 Mass. 1103, 485 N.E.2d 188 (1985), to show that Massachusetts' identical compara-
tive negligence law was construed to interpret the phrase "damages for negligence" as including
compensatory damages only.
49. Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 436-37, 418 N.W.2d at 822; see also Fahrenberg v. Tengel, 96 Wis.
2d 211, 234, 291 N.W.2d 516, 527 (1980)(quoting Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 84
Wis. 2d 91, 102, 267 N.W.2d 595, 601 (1978))(punitive damages are designed to hurt the defend-
ant in order to punish and deter similar conduct).
50. Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 437, 418 N.W.2d at 822. The court focused on the rationale
behind comparative negligence and punitive damages to reject such a mathematical formula when
determining punitive damages. Id.
51. Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1987-88) provides as follows:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or
property, if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against
whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion
to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
52. Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 431, 418 N.W.2d at 823; see Hanson v. Valdivia, 51 Wis. 2d 466,
474, 187 N.W.2d 151, 155 (1971)(there must be a showing of actual injury, which would justify
actual or compensatory damages, before punitive damages may be awarded); Wussow v. Commer-
cial Mechanisms, Inc., 97 Wis. 2d 136, 151, 293 N.W.2d 897, 905 (1980)(compensatory damages
are a condition precedent to an award of actual damages).
53. Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 441, 418, 441 N.W.2d at 824; see also Vincent v. Pabst Brewing
Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513 (1970)(rejection of invitation to adopt a system of pure
comparative negligence); Delvaux, 130 Wis. 2d at 476, 387 N.W.2d at 757 (reaffirmation of legisla-
tive commitment to modified comparative negligence).
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Ceci further indicated that in other jurisdictions, punitive damages are not
available absent an award of compensatory damages.14
The majority also discussed the principles utilized to determine the rea-
sonableness of the amount of a punitive award where the propriety of some
award is not disputed." Justice Ceci recognized that the determination of
punitive damages should be made on a case-by-case basis with due regard
given to the jury. 6 Finally, the majority reasoned that permitting an award
of punitive damages without the recovery of compensatory damages would
undermine the court's commitment to the doctrine of comparative
negligence.5 7
B. The Heffernan Dissent
Chief Justice Heffernan, in his dissent, agreed with the majority that the
phrase "damages for negligence" does not encompass punitive damages.58
However, the dissent distinguished itself from the majority by stating that
punitive damages should be recoverable even if the compensatory damages
are statutorily barred. 9
Justice Heffernan asserted that the term "actual damages" means that
punitive damages should be recoverable for a "compensable injury."60 The
dissent indicated that Nathaniel Tucker suffered the ultimate "compensable
54. See Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 443 n.9, 418 N.W.2d at 825 n.9.
55. See, eg., Brown, 124 Wis. 2d at 438, 369 N.W.2d at 684 (an award disproportionate to the
wrongdoing was found excessive and contrary to public policy); Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 302-03,
294 N.W.2d at 459 (refusal to adopt a mathematical formula for awarding punitive damages);
Fahrenberg, 96 Wis. 2d at 235-36, 291 N.W.2d at 527 (punitive damages must bear a reasonable
relationship to compensatory damages).
56. Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 448, 418 N.W.2d at 826; see also, e.g., Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 301-
02, 294 N.W.2d at 459 (reasonable relationship is not a requirement of a fixed ratio).
57. Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 450-52, 418 N.W.2d at 828; see also Vincent, 47 Wis. 2d at 129,
177 N.W.2d at 516 (requirement that compensatory damages must be recovered before punitive
damages can be awarded necessitates not only proof of injury, but also proof of causation); Presser
v. Siesel Constr. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 54, 66, 119 N.W.2d 405, 411 (1963) (as a matter of public policy
Wisconsin has been committed to the doctrine of comparative negligence).
.58. Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 455, 418 N.W.2d at 829 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting). Justice
Heffernan agreed with the majority that punitive damages arise from a different rationale than
compensatory damages. Id.
59. Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 456, 418 N.W.2d at 830. The dissent indicated that the Tucker
case was a very different situation from one in which no compensatory award was ever justified in
the first place. Id.
60. Id.; see also, e.g., Widemshek, 17 Wis. 2d 337, 117 N.W.2d 275 (1962)(plaintiff suffered
no loss); Hanson, 51 Wis. 2d 466, 187 N.W.2d 151 (1971)(plaintiff could not have been said to
have suffered an injury).
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injury," death, and therefore the Widemshek and Hanson cases relied on by
the majority could be clearly distinguished from the case at bar.6
The dissent further disputed the majority's analysis of the Wisconsin
cases which require punitive damages to bear a reasonable relationship to
compensatory damages.62 The majority read the applicable cases to mean
that when compensatory damages are not recoverable, punitive damages
may not be awarded. The dissent disagreed, stating that those cases stand
for the proposition that a punitive award will be upheld unless it is so
greatly disproportionate to the compensatory award that it "shocks the ju-
dicial conscience."63 Justice Heffernan indicated that the $50,000 in puni-
tive damages awarded by the jury would not shock his conscience."4
The dissent agreed with the majority that no Wisconsin case had
squarely answered the question of whether punitive damages could be re-
covered when the compensatory award is statutorily barred. Justice Heifer-
nan indicated, however, that the dictum in Hanson supported the
proposition that no recovery for injury is required, and that Wussow v.
Commercial Mechanisms, Inc.65 supported the position that the disposition
of the compensatory claim is irrelevant to the award of punitive damages.66
Based upon these two precedents, Justice Heffernan would have allowed a
recovery of $50,000 in punitive damages.
Finally, the dissent turned from history and precedent to a discussion of
the policy and rationale behind punitive damages. Justice Heffernan recog-
nized that punitive damages are designed to punish and deter outrageous
conduct and that the behavior of Marcus in running the MGM Health Club
was clearly "outrageous." 67 Hence, the dissent stated that punitive dam-
ages should be awarded irrespective of the recovery of compensatory
damages.
61. Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 456, 418 N.W.2d at 830.
62. Id. at 458, 418 N.W.2d at 831.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 459, 418 N.W.2d at 837.
65. 97 Wis. 2d 136, 293 N.W.2d 897 (1980). In holding that a settlement for compensatory
damages did not extinquish a claim for punitive damages, the Wussow court concluded that a
punitive damage award is justified where the defendant's conduct is "willful, wanton, and reck-
less." Id. at 153, 293 N.W.2d at 905.
66. Justice Heffernan indicated that according to legislative intent, it is reasonably certain
that the comparative negligence statute was not intended to affect awards of punitive damages.
Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 460, 418 N.W.2d at 832.
67. The dissent pointed out that the majority views punitive damages as a method of enrich-
ing the plaintiff, rather than as a punishment to the wrongdoer. Id. at 463, 418 N.W.2d at 833.
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V. CRITIQUE
A. Analysis of the Tucker v. Marcus Decision
In Tucker v. Marcus,6" the Supreme Court of Wisconsin followed the
trend of other jurisdictions which hold that punitive damages may not be
recovered absent an award of compensatory damages. 9 The majority and
dissent correctly held that the phrase "damages for negligence" does not
include punitive damages because compensatory and punitive damages are
based upon different rationales. The decision, however, brings into focus
several problems relating to the determination of "actual damages" in fu-
ture case law. Specifically, the decision highlights the difficulty in determin-
ing: (1) whether punitive damages should be allowed when harm has only
been "sustained"; (2) whether punitive damages are a completely separate
entity from the comparative negligence statute; and (3) whether such dam-
ages must bear a reasonable relationship to actual damages.
1. Should a "Compensable Injury" Suffice as a Proper Foundation for
Punitive Damages?
The Tucker majority adopted the standard that actual damages must be
recoverable under the comparative negligence statute before punitive dam-
ages can be awarded.7" Many jurisdictions, however, state that punitive
damages will be allowed when an injury is "sustained" because punishment
and deterrence are warranted when any type of harm occurs that results in
a "compensable injury."71 Certainly Nathaniel Tucker's death was a "com-
pensable injury," and punitive damages would serve as a punishment for
Marcus' "outrageous" behavior.
68. 142 Wis. 2d 425, 418 N.W.2d 818 (1988).
69. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
70. 142 Wis. 2d at 438-39, 418 N.W.2d at 823.
71. See Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 55, 477 A.2d 1224, 1232
(1984)(punitive damages may be recovered where plaintiff establishes an intentional tort, even
though no actual damages are recovered); see also Howell v. Association Hotels, 40 Haw. 492, 497
(1954) (the better rule permits punitive damages when plaintiff establishes cause of action, even
though no actual damages are measured or shown); Westfield Centre Serv. v. Cities Serv. Oil, 158
N.J. Super. 455, 480, 386 A.2d 448, 464 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978)(where court determines that a
legal right is invaded, punitive damages are recoverable without recovery of actual damages).
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2. Are Compensatory and Punitive Damages Completely Separate
Entities?
The rationale behind punitive damages (to punish and deter) predated
any comparative negligence statute.72 It gives the jury (average members of
society) the ability to stop willful, wanton and malicious behavior by deter-
ring that type of conduct through the award of punitive damages.7 3 Hence,
the ability to recover damages under the comparative negligence statute
should be irrelevant. The Tucker majority failed to address the issue of
whether the refusal to award punitive damages when compensatory dam-
ages are statutorily barred undermines the jury's basic function which is at
the heart of our legal system.74
The majority justified the condition precedent of the recovery of actual
damages by discussing Wisconsin's unwillingness to depart from the modi-
fied comparative negligence statute.75 Justice Ceci explained that the intent
of the legislature was not to create the anomalous result of allowing an
award of punitive damages where conduct, although outrageous, was not
within the standard articulated by the legislature under the comparative
negligence statute.76 Nevertheless, the court failed to recognize the impor-
tant distinction between compensatory and punitive damages.
Wisconsin Statute section 895.045 was adopted to take into considera-
tion the contributory negligence of the plaintiff.77 Before the enactment of
the comparative negligence statute, contributory negligence was a complete
bar to recovery. 78 The statute now focuses on the plaintiff. An award of
punitive damages focuses on the defendant's conduct. Hence, actual and
punitive damages are completely separate entities and the recovery of com-
pensatory damages under the statute should not be a prerequisite for the
recovery of punitive damages.
72. For a discussion of the history of punitive damages, see supra notes 19-36 and accompa-
nying text.
73. For a discussion of the requirement of punitive damages, see supra note 22 and accompa-
nying text.
74. 50 C.J.S. Juries § 2 (1947). The term "jury" refers to a group of people who are called
upon to weigh the questions at issue and to pass judgment upon the proof of such facts.
75. Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 441, 418 N.W.2d at 824.
76. Id. at 441-42, 418 N.W.2d at 824.
77. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
78. See Graass v. Westerlin & Campbell Co., 194 Wis. 470, 216 N.W. 161 (1927); Rusczck v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 191 Wis. 130, 210 N.W. 361 (1926); Stephan v. Abe, 185 Wis. 78, 200
N.W. 682 (1924).
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3. Must Punitive Damages Bear a Reasonable Relationship to
Compensatory Damages?
The majority in Tucker argued that ascertaining the amount of actual
damages is necessary so that punitive damages will bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to the actual damages awarded.79 The purpose of the "reasonable
relationship" rule is to avoid excessive punitive awards. s0 The rule has been
adopted by a majority of jurisdictions to provide guidelines for jurors in
assessing punitive damages,8' but the application of the rule has varied. 2
The trend is to assess the reasonableness of the punitive damage award
in relation to the defendant's conduct and the injury inflicted on the plain-
tiff. 3 This variation allows courts to grant punitive damages when the de-
fendant's conduct so warrants, even if no actual damages are found or
ascertained. 4 Hence, the "reasonable relationship" requirement mentioned
by the majority can be circumvented.
79. Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 447, 418 N.W.2d at 826 (rule requiring recovery of actual dam-
ages follows from rule requiring punitive damages to be reasonably proportionate to actual
damages).
80. See K. REDDEN, supra note 19, § 3.6(c), at 63 (1980)(discussion of reasonable relation
rule). "The value of the 'reasonable relation rule' is that it serves as a rough device to allow a
court to pare down an excessive award of punitive damages." Id. at 64; see also W. PROSSER &
W.P. KEETON, supra note 27, § 2, at 14-15 (punitive and actual damages must bear reasonable
relationship so that a small compensatory award will not support a large punitive award).
81. See, e.g., Note, supra note 20, at 1170 (reasonable relationship rule attempts to specify
standards for imposing punitive damages); Note, supra note 23, at 530 (purpose of reasonable
relationship method is to limit jury's discretion).
82. Compare Senn v. Manchester Bank of St. Louis, 583 S.W.2d 119, 138 (Mo.
1979)($491,892 actual damages and $737,838 punitive damages calculated by specific formula of a
"multiple of one and one-half times actual damages") with Binyon v. Nesseth, 231 Kan. 381, 383-
90, 646 P.2d 1043, 1044-47 (1982)(award of $9,326.06 actual damages and $100,000 punitive
damages upheld because it did not shock the conscience of the court).
83. See, e.g., Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co., 106 IIl. 3d 1, 26, 435 N.E.2d 729,
746-47 (Ct. App. 1982) (where jury found defendant acted with conscious indifference in regard to
safety of product users, punitive damages award was appropriate); Leimgruber v. Claridge Assoc.,
73 N.J. 450, 458, 375 A.2d 652, 655 (1977)(in assessing punitive damages, two factors to consider
are the nature of defendant's acts and the injury inflicted on the plaintiff); Black v. Gardner, 320
N.W.2d 153, 161 (S.D. 1982)(when determining amount of punitive damages, one should consider
the amount of actual damages as well as the wrongdoer's conduct and intent).
84. See, e.g., Haskins v. Shelden, 558 P.2d 487,492-93 (Alaska 1976)(when complaint states a
claim for relief, independent of claim for punitive damages, no actual damages need be recovered);
Nales v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 398 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)(invasion
of legal right or injury suffered is requisite to awarding punitive damages, not recovery of actual
damages); Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872, 881 (W. Va. 1982)(where there is evidence of an injury
to plaintiff, failure to recover actual damages does not preclude granting of punitive damages).
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B. Implications of the Tucker v. Marcus Decision
As a result of the decision in Tucker, the modified comparative negli-
gence statute adopted in Wisconsin will remain uncontested. The statute
was adopted to avoid frivolous litigation." Changing the statute to a pure
comparative negligence statute would increase claims and litigation and
would be the first step towards a "no fault" system, whereby the wrongdoer
is allowed to profit from his own wrongdoing. Allowing plaintiffs of greater
fault to recover would burden the general public with a larger premium for
insurance and cost for judicial administration.8 6
Adherence to the modified comparative negligence statute, however, di-
minishes the role of the jury. In fact, punitive damages may eventually be
abolished if they are only permitted when compensatory damages have been
recovered under the statute. Abolishing punitive damages would not only
run counter to many years of history and case law that has developed, but it
would also fail to deter conduct that is malicious, wanton, and willful.87
A second implication of the decision in Tucker is that punitive damages
may be allowed irrespective of the amount of damages that are recovered
under the comparative negligence statute. The majority reasoned that ac-
tual damages are a prerequisite for punitive damages because "punitive
damages may not be imposed in cases of zero compensatory awards." 8
This reasoning, however, will create problems in future cases because the
courts will then have to decide whether to permit punitive damage awards
when only nominal damages are recovered under the statute. Awarding
punitive damages when only nominal damages have been sustained, how-
ever, tends to undermine the majority's reliance on Wisconsin case law
which states that punitive damages cannot bear a reasonable relationship to
zero compensatory damages.
A third implication of the Tucker decision on future case law is that the
court will now have to address whether punitive damages can be awarded
when equitable relief is granted. A majority of jurisdictions have allowed
punitive damages with equitable relief. In White v. Ruditys,89 the Wiscon-
sin Court of Appeals stated that punitive damages may be awarded with
equitable relief.90 However, it seems inconsistent that punitive damages can
be granted with equitable relief when actual damages have not been recov-
85. Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 442, 418 N.W.2d at 824.
86. Id.
87. See supra notes 19-36 and accompanying text for history and requisites of punitive
damages.
88. Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 448, 418 N.W.2d at 827.
89. 117 Wis. 2d 130, 343 N.W.2d 421 (Ct. App. 1983).
90. Id. at 132, 343 N.W.2d at 422.
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ered under the comparative negligence statute. Justice Ceci in Tucker
stated that if punitive damages are awarded when an injury is only "sus-
tained," the comparative negligence statute will be effectively
circumvented. 91
The modem trend is to allow the recovery of punitive damages in con-
junction with equitable relief.92 However, varying rules have emerged in
many states as to what criteria must be present before punitive damages can
be granted with equitable relief." A number of states which allow punitive
damages in equitable suits require at least a showing or a finding of actual
damages before punitive damages will be granted.94 These courts contend
that if the plaintiff provides evidence of an injury suffered, there can be a
91. Tucker, 142 Wis. 2d at 440-41, 418 N.W.2d at 823.
92. See DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDiES § 3.9, at 211 (1973)(movement to
allow punitive damages with equitable relief); see also Martin v. Swenson, 335 F. Supp. 765, 768
(W.D. Mo. 1971); Berry v. McLeod, 124 Ariz. 346, 351, 604 P.2d 610, 613 (1979); Union Oil Co.
of Cal. v. Reconstruction Oil Co., 20 Cal. App. 2d 170, 190, 66 P.2d 1215, 1222 (1937); General
Refractories Co. v. Rogers, 240 Ga. 228, 237, 239 S.E.2d 795, 800 (1977); Lussier v. Mau-Van
Dev., Inc., 4 Haw. App. 359, 392, 667 P.2d 804, 825 (1983); Hedworth v. Chapman, 135 Ind.
App. 129, 192 N.E.2d 649, 651 (Ct. App. 1963); Charles v. Epperson & Co., 258 Iowa 409, 430,
137 N.W.2d 605, 618 (1965); Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454, 464 (Miss.
1983); Tahoe Village Realty v. DeSmet, 95 Nev. 131, 139, 590 P.2d 1158, 1161 (1979); I.H.P.
Corp. v. 210 Central Park S. Corp., 228 N.Y.S.2d 883, 888 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962), aff'd, 12
N.Y.2d 329, 189 N.E.2d 812, 239 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1963); Eakman v. Robb, 237 N.W.2d 423, 430
(N.D. 1975); Z.D. Howard Co. v. Cartwright, 537 P.2d 345, 347 (Okla. 1975); Kneeland v. Bruce,
47 Tenn. App. 136, 150, 336 S.W.2d 319, 325 (Ct. App. 1960); National Bank of Commerce v.
May, 583 S.W.2d 685, 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); White, 117 Wis. 2d at 139, 343 N.W.2d at 425.
93. Compare Smith v. Krutar, 457 P.2d 459, 464 (Mont. 1969)(to recover punitive damages,
- the plaintiff must show he is first entitled to actual damages) with Wilner v. O'Donnell, 637
S.W.2d 757, 762 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)(actual damages must be recovered before punitive damages
can be granted).
94. See Westway Trading Corp. v. River Terminal Corp., 314 N.W.2d 398, 404 (Iowa
1982)(equitable relief and punitive damages sustained, while actual damages reversed, in suit for
interference with lease rights). The court in Westway held that although the amount of actual
damages could not be ascertained, punitive damages were still recoverable since actual injury was
demonstrated. Id.; see also Miller v. Fox, 571 P.2d 804, 808 (Mont. 1977)(award of punitive
damages for wrongful attachment). The trial court in Miller found that the plaintiff had suffered
actual damages due to expenses incurred. See id. at 808. The award of punitive damages in Miller
was sustained by the Montana Supreme Court, which stated that actual damages are a prerequi-
site to the recovery of punitive damages. Id.; see also Barber v. Hohl, 40 N.J. Super. 526, 123
A.2d 785, 789-90 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956)(writ for injunction and actual and punitive
damages). Even though the court in Barber held that the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial on
the issue of actual damages, punitive damages were sustained. Id. at 789-90. The Barber court
found that when an individual is injured as a result of an invasion of a legal right, damages are
inferred. Id. at 789; see also Hutchison v. Pyburn, 567 S.W.2d 762, 765-66 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1977)(action for rescission of deed and punitive damages). In Hutchison, the court held that the
plaintiffs were entitled to punitive damages since the plaintiffs proved entitlement to the recission
of the deed, return of the purchase price, and incurred incidental damages. Id. at 766.
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recovery of punitive damages without recovering actual damages.95 Other
states permit an injured plaintiff to recover punitive damages in an equitable
action where only nominal damages are recovered. 96 Further, a small mi-
nority of states have allowed recovery of punitive damages when equitable
relief is granted, absent a showing of recovery of either actual or nominal
damages.97 Despite these lenient views, some states continue to require an
award of actual damages as a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages,
even when equitable relief is granted. 98
VI. RECOMMENDATION
A solution to the problem would be to allow punitive damages irrespec-
tive of the ability to recover compensatory damages. The concern of exces-
sive punitive awards has been addressed in a different manner by other
jurisdictions which instead use several factors to limit punitive damage
awards.99 Those factors include: (1) the nature of the wrong; (2) the char-
95. See Topanga Corp. v. Gentile, 249 Cal. App. 2d 681, -, 58 Cal. Rptr. 713, 719
(1967)(tortious act needs to be proven to meet requirements of actual damages before punitive
damages recoverable); Miller, 571 P.2d at 808 (unnecessary for monetary value to be placed on
actual damage award); see also Sterling Drug v. Benatar, 99 Cal. App. 2d 425, 440, 221 P.2d 965,
970 (Ct. App. 1950)(punitive damages sustained although amount of actual damages not ascer-
tainable); cf Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872, 880 (W. Va. 1982)(in suit where equitable relief not
sought, court held that when plaintiff establishes injury caused by defendant, an award of actual
damages is not necessary to sustain punitive damages).
96. See Onslow Wholesale Plumbing & Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Fisher, 60 N.C. App. 55, 66, 298
S.E.2d 718, 723 (Ct. App. 1982)(in suit for violation of fiduciary duties, punitive damages were
denied in absence of recovery of nominal or compensatory damages). The Onslow court held that
nominal damages were the minimum requirement that must be met before punitive damages could
be granted with an equitable remedy. Id. at 723; see also Civic W. Corp. v. Zila Indus., Inc., 66
Cal. App. 3d 1, 19, 135 Cal. Rptr. 915, 926 (Ct. App. 1977)(in action for injunction and recovery
of promissory notes, punitive damages recoverable though actual damages were nominal).
97. See, e.g., Village of Peck v. Denison, 92 Idaho 747, 756-58, 450 P.2d 310, 314-15
(1969)(equitable suit to enjoin interference with water rights sustained award of punitive dam-
ages); Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hohman, 682 P.2d 1309, 1310 (Kan. 1984)(punitive
damages recoverable in foreclosure action where no actual damages were awarded); Nash v.
Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d 775, 778 (Utah 1978)(in action for recission of property, punitive damages
were determined by considering defendant's conduct, not by whether actual damages were
shown). But see Smith, 153 Mont. at 333, 457 P.2d at 464 (in suit to enjoin defendants from use of
stream water, punitive damages denied since plaintiff not entitled to actual damages).
98. See, e.g., Wilner, 637 S.W.2d at 762 (punitive damages denied after actual damage award
reversed); Johnson v. Pilgrim Mut. Ins. Co., 425 A.2d 1119, 1125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)(punitive
award upheld after finding that plaintiff had been granted compensatory damages); National Bank
of Commerce v. May, 583 S.W.2d 685, 691-92 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)(punitive damages denied
where actual damages not recovered).
99. See, e.g., Dodge Motors, Inc. v. Rodgers, 16 Ariz. App. 24, 490 P.2d 853 (Ct. App. 1971);
Goshgarian v. George, 208 Cal. Rptr. 321, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1214 (1984); Grimshaw v. Ford
Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (1981); Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735, 682
P.2d 1282 (Ct. App. 1984); Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., 177 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 532 N.E.2d 1091
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acter of the conduct involved; (3) the degree of culpability of the wrong-
doer; (4) the situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned; and (5) the
extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and
propriety. 1o
VII. CONCLUSION
Tucker v. MarcuslO1 presented the Supreme Court of Wisconsin with a
case that forced the court to address the issue of allowing punitive damages
when compensatory damages are statutorily barred. By using Wisconsin
case law, the court reached an equitable resolution of the problem, allowing
punitive damages only when compensatory damages have been recovered
under the statute.
Although the court recognized the propriety of this requirement, it left
crucial issues unresolved. The decision did not address the fact that nomi-
nal damages would suffice to meet the requirement necessary to recover
punitive damages. It also failed to acknowledge that no such requirement
exists for equitable actions. Further, the Tucker requirement can be cir-
cumvented if Wisconsin were to adopt the factors used in other jurisdictions
to avoid excessive punitive awards.
JOEL H. SPITZ
(Ct. App. 1988); Kiser v. Gilmore, 2 Kan. App. 2d 683, 587 P.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1978); Wilson v.
City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1980); Dahlen v. Landis, 314 N.W.2d 63 (N.D. 1981);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 594 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), modified, 622 S.W.2d 563
(1981).
100. See K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 640 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
101. 142 Wis. 2d 425, 418 N.W.2d 818 (1988).
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